Sobre jueces en regímenes injustos

Raymond Wacks "Judges and Injustice," S. Afr. L.J. 266 (1984)

If the judge is to square his conscience with his calling, there would appear to be no choice open to him but to resign. How have I arrived at this conclusion? First, by rejecting the positivist assumption that judges have discretion in the strong sense. Secondly, by recognizing that South Africa conforms in many ways to the model of a repressive legal system. Thirdly, by accepting that a judge in such a system who is unable to reconcile his moral standpoint with the law has three choices: to protest, to lie or to resign. And fourthly (by expressing doubts on whether protests would bear fruit, and by pointing to the limitations of the judicial lie-caused principally by the severe constraints of the courts'jurisdiction) concluding that there is no compelling alternative to resignation.